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LOOKING BACKWARD: RICHARD EPSTEIN
PONDERS THE "PROGRESSIVE" PERIL
Michael Allan Wolf*
How PROGRESSIVES REWROTE THE CONSTITUTION. By Richard A. Epstein.
Washington, D.C.: Cato Institute. 2006. Pp. xiii, 156. $15.95.
INTRODUCTION
The utmost possible liberty to the individual, and the fullest possible pro-
tection to him and his property, is both the limitation and duty of
government. If it may regulate the price of one service, which is not a pub-
lic service, or the compensation for the use of one kind of property which
is not devoted to a public use, why may it not with equal reason regulate
the price of all service, and the compensation to be paid for the use of all
property? And if so, "Looking Backward" is nearer than a dream.
-Justice David J. Brewer'
In the 1888 novel Looking Backward, Edward Bellamy dreamed up a
twentieth century America that was a socialist utopia,2 a vision invoked four
years later by the conservative Justice David J. Brewer as a warning against
government regulation.' In How Progressives Rewrote the Constitution,
Richard Epstein,4 looking back at the twentieth century through an interpre-
tive lens much more similar to Brewer's than Bellamy's, sees and bemoans
the growth of a dominant big government of which the novelist could only
dream. Epstein pulls no punches in his attack on those he deems responsible
* Richard E. Nelson Chair in Local Government Law, University of Florida Levin College
of Law. The author thanks Bill Page, Juan Perea, Chris Peterson, Michael Siebecker, Chris Slobo-
gin, Barbara Woodhouse, and Danaya Wright for sharing their valuable insights, and Neil Rumbak
and Steven Wernick for their excellent research assistance.
1. Budd v. New York, 143 U.S. 517, 551 (1892) (Brewer, J., dissenting). See J. Gordon
Hylton, The Judge Who Abstained in Plessy v. Ferguson: Justice David Brewer and the Problem of
Race, 61 Miss. L.J. 315, 318-19 (1991) ("He believed that liberty of contract was a right protected
by the Constitution; he favored a narrow interpretation of the state police power; and he rejected the
concept of a paternalistic state.").
2. EDWARD BELLAMY, LOOKING BACKWARD: 2000 TO 1887, at 93-94 (John L. Thomas, ed.,
The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press 1967) (1888).
3. For a helpful introduction to the place Bellamy's utopian novel holds in American his-
tory, see William H. Page, Ideological Conflict and the Origins of Antitrust Policy, 66 TuL. L. REv.
1, 28-29 (1991) (discussing "the growth of popular reform movements and their supporting ideolo-
gies" in the latter part of the nineteenth century, as reflected in Bellamy's popular and highly
influential novel).
4. James Parker Hall Distinguished Service Professor of Law, University of Chicago.
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for the shift in the American polity from private to public control, asserting
that the "Progressives ... were determined that their vision of the managed
economy should take precedence in all areas of life," and that they "and
their modem defenders have to live with the stark truth that the noblest in-
novations of the Progressive Era were its greatest failures."5 • • 6
Epstein, the nation's leading classical liberal legal scholar/lightning rod,
has Progressivism and its constitutional legacy in his sights in his latest
work. His intent is to show how, during the early decades of the twentieth
century, "Progressive" justices on the U.S. Supreme Court began a con-
certed and ultimately successful attack on traditional views of government
power, which to that point had been severely curtailed, and of individual
rights, which to that point had been quite expansive. According to Epstein's
brief though meandering historical account,7 the regulatory policies that
these revolutionary judges championed-despite apparent conflicts between
the policies and important liberty interests-amounted to government-
sponsored cartels and monopolies. Looking backward from our day to the
dawn of the modem regulatory state, Epstein identifies the Progressive Era
as the point at which the nation was led astray from its founding, indubita-
bly classical liberal, principles. His yearning for a return to the ideology and
jurisprudence of the "Old Court" is palpable.
This slim volume, comprising a bit more than 150 small pages, is based
on the B. Kenneth Simon Lecture in Constitutional Thought that Epstein
delivered at the Cato Institute in the fall of 2004, in which he spoke on "the
intellectual development of the Progressive movement of which [he] ha[s]
long been critical on constitutional, economic, and philosophical grounds"
(p. vii). Epstein's design in that lecture, and in How Progressives, is to "of-
fer[] a full defense of the earlier constitutional protection of economic
liberties-the right to dispose of one's labor and property as one sees fit-
and a limited view of federal power under the Commerce Clause of the
United States Constitution. ' 8 How Progressives should receive a warm re-
ception from the audience, lawyers and laypeople alike, who view the New
5. P. 137. Epstein paints a somewhat anachronistic portrait of the Progressives-"the self-
conscious social and legal reformers who occupied center stage in the period roughly from the onset
of the 20th century through the election of Franklin Delano Roosevelt as president in 1932"-and of
their "key social and legal positions." Pp. 2-3.
6. For a fond, though cautious, appraisal of Epstein's influence, see generally James W. Ely,
Jr., Impact of Richard A. Epstein, (Vanderbilt Public Law Research Paper No. 05-31, 2005), avail-
able at http://ssm.com/abstract=825045. For a recent case that relies on Epstein's classical liberal
view, see City of Norwood v. Homey, 853 N.E.2d 1115 (Ohio 2006) (invalidating a local govern-
ment's use of eminent domain).
7. For example, in what is supposed to be a discussion of the Old Court's federalism, on
pages 24-33, Epstein goes back to the Marshall Court (for good reason), but then leaps ahead to the
post-1937 Court, citing opinions by "Progressive" Justices. He also introduces some good Old
Court federalism cases in Chapter Three ("he Progressive Era").
8. Pp. vii-viii. See also Richard A. Epstein, The Monopolistic Vices of Progressive Consti-
tutionalism, CATO SuP. CT. REv., 2004-2005, at 11, 11 n.*, available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/
scr/2005/progressiveconstitutionalism.pdf.
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Deal as a mistake of epic proportions.9 For the rest of us, significant gaps
will still remain between, on the one hard, our understanding of the nation's
past and of the complex nature of constitutional lawmaking and, on the
other, Epstein's version of the nature of twentieth-century reform and Pro-
gressive jurisprudence.
How Progressives, like many of the works in the impressive Epstein bib-
liography, is important not only because of the provocative nature of its
arguments, but also because of the wide and ideologically diverse audience
that pays attention to this important and seemingly ubiquitous voice in the
classical liberal chorus. The book returns the reader to some of the themes
Epstein raised in Takings,'° his influential 1985 work that launched the mod-
em private-property-rights movement," and it follows on the heels of
another offering from Cato's closet: Randy Barnett's Restoring the LostS 12
Constitution. Given the current judiciary's keen interest in the framers'
intent and skepticism about the powers of the federal government, How
Progressives has the potential to be another influential Epstein work, but
only if some fundamental flaws are overlooked or excused by the reading
audience.
Following a summary of the stated goals and organization of How Pro-
gressives, this review, in an attempt to provide a counterbalance for
Epstein's visions of the formative period of modem constitutionalism, con-
siders three aspects of the book: First, Epstein's practice, shared by many
constitutional law scholars, of starting the "story" of a legal doctrine in the
middle, in particular, paying too little attention to the suspect nature of the
individual "liberty" jurisprudence fashioned by the Old Court. The second
notable aspect is Epstein's effort to place himself at the "moderate" point on
the ideological scale. Finally, this review will consider his premature attempt
to write "winner's history." Epstein's unorthodox version of the social and
economic conditions that gave rise to reform in the first few decades of the
twentieth century, like his demonization of "Progressive" legal thought,
9. See, e.g., David E. Bernstein, Roots of the "Underclass": The Decline of Laissez-Faire
Jurisprudence and the Rise of Racist Labor Legislation, 43 AM. U. L. REV. 85, 119-35 (1993)
("New Deal Labor Legislation as a Cause of Persistent Black Unemployment"); see also Cass R.
Sunstein, Congress, Constitutional Moments, and the Cost-Benefit State, 48 STAN. L. REV. 247, 255
(1996) ("One of the most striking features of the period since 1980 has been sustained national
criticism of the New Deal reformation.").
10. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT Do-
MAIN (1985).
It. See, e.g., Douglas T. Kendall & Charles P. Lord, The Takings Project: A Critical Analysis
and Assessment of the Progress So Far, 25 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 509, 510 (1998) ("[M]any of
the changes in takings law that have taken place over the last 11 years correspond quite closely to a
blueprint for takings doctrine proposed by Professor Richard Epstein in his now-famous book called
Takings .... ).
12. RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIB-
ERTY (2004). We can easily view Epstein's new book as an effort to reclaim preeminence among his
liberty-devoted peers. See Steven G. Calabresi, The Originalist and Normative Case Against Judi-
cial Activism: A Reply to Professor Randy Barnett, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1081, 1081-82 (2005) (book
review) ("Barnett's book immediately replaces Richard Epstein's Takings as the leading tome about
constitutional law written from a libertarian perspective.") (footnote omitted).
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should not be surprising to those familiar with his earlier writings. Still, de-
spite Epstein's efforts in How Progressives to portray himself as a moderate,
this problematic historical foray demonstrates that Epsteinian ideas, like
Bellamy's utopian socialist dreams, do not yet hold a place in or near Amer-
ica's ideological center.
I. GIVING HISTORY A TRY
In the Preface entitled "Why We Must Reopen Closed Debates" (p. vii),
Epstein challenges the view, which he attributes to "many, lawyers and lay-
men alike," that "there seems to be little reason to unearth a set of legal
controversies that had sorted themselves out by the middle of the New Deal
in favor of expanded government power" (p. viii). Epstein then asks, "[I]f
the Progressives remade the Constitution in their own image, so what?"
(p. viii). But Epstein cannot resist taking the opportunity to set the historical
record straight, in order "to correct what [he] believe[s] to be pervasive mis-
conceptions about the central features of the pre-New Deal constitutional
legal order-chiefly, federalism and economic liberties," and to "help in-
form readers of the ability of these now discarded views to lead us toward
sound constitutional government in the years to come" (p. xiii). For these
and other 3 reasons, Epstein has decided to dabble in history.
In the introduction that follows, before addressing the struggle between
"Progressives and traditionalists," Epstein turns to "a few preliminaries on
constitutional theory"-a nuanced, non-Scalian 4 version of "constitutional
textualism,"'' 5 and a short tutorial on "the level of scrutiny the Court should
apply in exercising its power of judicial review" (pp. 10-11). Throughout
the book, Epstein returns to these two elements in an attempt to convince his
reader that our rights are best protected by non-deferential judges who are
not hesitant to depart from the exact wording of the constitutional text.
In the next chapter, "The Classical Liberal Synthesis," Epstein explains
that, while classical liberals and pure libertarians both favor "freedom of
choice and freedom of contract" (p. 16), there are differences, such as the
latter group's intolerance of the state's exercise of taxation and eminent do-
main powers. Given the absolutist nature of pure libertarianism, Epstein
feels comfortable noting in passing "that the Constitution is unambiguously
in the classical liberal camp" (p. 16). When the list of possible choices of
ideology moves beyond these two kissing cousins, however, ambiguity rears
13. One of those other reasons could be the contemporary context in which the newly framed
debate is taking place. It is highly likely, if not a certainty, that in the wake of the Reagan Revolu-
tion, the American reading public is more skeptical of government power. Unfortunately, Epstein
takes this general skepticism a good bit too far when he asserts that "no longer do most people have
unquestioned faith in the desire or ability of the government to act only in the public interest" (p. 13;
emphasis added). Even during the height of Franklin Delano Roosevelt's popularity during the New
Deal, such unqualified devotion was not prevalent.
14. See, e.g., Michael J. Gerhardt, A Tale of Two Textualists: A Critical Comparison of Jus-
tices Black and Scalia, 74 B.U. L. REV. 25 (1994).
15. P. 9 ("[Tlhis textual enterprise is only the first stage of the larger business of constitu-
tional interpretation.").
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its ugly head. In other words, while it is easy to concede that the Constitu-
tion is more classical liberal than libertarian, that does not mean that the
document (especially when one includes the Reconstruction amendments)
does not also encompass philosophical positions that are more accommodat-
ing of the modem regulatory state.
Epstein then explores how well the "American constitutional experi-
ence"-first the justices of the Old Court (a term whose temporal dimension
he never nails down, although we know its reign ended in the October 1936
Term), and then, in the following chapter, "The Progressive Era" justices-
"stack[s] up" against the classical liberal ideal whose "watchwords are lim-
ited government, private property, and freedom of conduct" (p. 19). Most
readers will not be surprised to learn that, in both general areas of inquiry-
federalism and individual rights (primarily property and contract)-the tra-
ditionalists on the late nineteenth and early twentieth century Courts
outperformed their left-leaning successors. The traditionalists remained true
to the classical liberal principles that supposedly informed the Constitution
in cases involving rate regulation, monopolies, and labor regulation. In-
cluded in the last category are cases that received very broad condemnation
among legal academics until the last few decades: Lochner v. New York,1
6
invalidating maximum hours legislation, 7 and three cases upholding "yel-
low-dog" labor contracts "that required a worker not to be a union member
(or not to become one on the union demand) so long as he remained in the
employ of the firm." The "Progressives" pulled the Constitution away from
its classical liberal moorings in the federalism and individual rights arenas
(now expanded to include civil liberties other than those of property and
contract), much to Epstein's dismay: "However grandly their rhetoric spoke
about the need for sensible government intervention in response to changed
16. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). Lochner's shifting reputation has been the subject of much legal
commentary, especially on the occasion of the opinion's centennial. The Lochner symposium,
opened and summarized by David J. Seipp, Lochner Centennial Conference, Introduction, 85 B.U.
L. REV. 671 (2005), provides examples of such legal commentary.
17. Lochner, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). Epstein notes that, in addition to "the dangers of legislative
paternalism ... a second, if tacit, dimension of the case concerns the competitive position of small,
immigrant-owned bakeries against their larger, unionized rivals." P. 48. This dimension is probably a
lot more imagined than "tacit." According to Paul Kens, who has written widely and carefully on the
history of Lochner, "[t]hose who claim that a conspiracy of unions and large bakeries produced the
Bakeshop Act provide no primary support." Paul Kens, Lochner v. New York: Tradition or Change
in Constitutional Law?, I N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 404, 409 n.19 (2005); see also PAUL KENS,
Lochner v. New York: ECONOMIC REGULATION ON TRIAL (1998).
18. P. 49. The three cases are Hitchnian Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U.S. 229 (1917),
Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915), and Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908), discussed
on pp. 48-50. These contracts developed their colorful name because "labor complained bitterly
[that the contracts] treated workers like 'yellow dogs."' EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., BRANDEIS AND
THE PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTION: ERIE, THE JUDICIAL POWER, AND THE POLITICS OF THE FEDERAL
COURTS IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA 71 (2000).
Rather than focus on the onerous nature of this provision in an unequal bargaining situation, or
on the limited opportunities many workers had to seek alternative employment, Epstein draws a link
between enforcement of the clause and the promotion of a central classical liberal strategy: "The key
advantage of that contract from a social perspective is that it retards the formation of labor monopo-
lies.' P. 49.
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conditions, the bottom line, sadly, was always the same: replace competitive
processes, by hook or by crook, with state-run cartels" (pp. 52-53). In this
way, Epstein conflates state and federal regulation (of railroad rates, child
labor, maximum hours, and price floors) with ownership. So now, in order to
endorse Epstein's conclusion, the reader must believe (1) the Constitution is
close to a purely classical liberal document, (2) the Old Court consistently
applied classical liberal principles, (3) a large chunk of government regula-
tion amounts to monopolistic behavior, and (4) judges who uphold such
regulations enacted by coequal branches of government (even by over-
whelming margins)' 9 are the ones "rewriting the Constitution."
Probably the most controversial example of the benefits to be gained by
neutralizing Progressive regulation that Epstein includes in How Progres-
sives is his defense of the otherwise notorious Hammer v. Dagenhart,2° the
1918 decision in which a slim majority of the Court struck down a federal
law prohibiting the transportation in interstate commerce of certain goods
manufactured by businesses that used child labor, because the statute ex-
ceeded Congress's power under the Commerce Clause. Epstein's major
problem with the act that the Court struck down is that firms were forced to
"capitulate[] to the federal mandate" (p. 59). Viewed through the classical
liberal lens, the greater evil here was not the employment of children in fac-
tories, sweatshops, and other hazardous settings, but the stifling of
competition: "For our purposes, what is important in Hammer is the light it
sheds on the general principle of competition between states as a means to
choose the optimal level of regulation" (p. 60). Moreover, essential contract
rights are also at stake, as Epstein earlier notes: "[T]he prohibition on child
labor often misunderstood the complex nature of these contracts, which of-
ten included, in addition to employment, some education and custodial care.
The cost of invalidating these contracts was that it reduced the opportunities
available to children who were members of well-functioning families.
19. For a notorious example, the Bakeshop Act struck down in Lochner passed both houses
of the New York legislature unanimously. David E. Bernstein, Lochner v. New York: A Centennial
Retrospective, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 1469, 1482 (2005) (citing Paul Kens, Lochner v. New York: Reha-
bilitated and Revised, but Still Reviled, 1995 J. SuP. CT. HiST. 31, 34).
20. 247 U.S. 251 (1918).
21. P. 43. Even more revealing is this example of the logic employed by Epstein in ponder-
ing the apparent illogic behind child labor laws:
Here the [federal government's] argument has to be that child labor laws are needed in order to
prevent parents from abusing their offspring. On this view, weak laws should be construed as a
license to commit neglect and abuse, so that more stringent standards become an urgent neces-
sity. But that judgment presupposes that most parents of limited means will place their own
interests above those of their children, when the safer assumption is that parents will trade off
their own interests with those of their children, typically enduring great personal sacrifice to
help ensure that their children lead better lives. On this view, parents whose children engage in
child labor are making the best of a bad situation. If so, then the alternative to child labor is not
a life of education or leisure for the young. It could be begging, prostitution, or back-breaking
work in the informal economy, without the benefit of any legal protection at all.
P. 61 (footnote omitted).
For less controversial versions of the evils of child labor laws, see Richard A. Epstein, Stand-
ing and Spending-The Role of Legal and Equitable Principles, 4 CHAP. L. REV. 1, 30-31 (2001);
1238 [Vol. 105:1233
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Epstein would shift the burden to defenders of the Progressives to ex-
plain why a legislative solution was needed when, after all, "the percentage
of children in the workforce declined consistently throughout the period
before federal regulation of child labor" (p. 62). Epstein himself has already
discussed one probable factor for the decline-the numerous state laws that
the federal legislation was designed to complement and strengthen. More-
over, even if we rely on the figures that Epstein provides earlier in How
Progressives, there were still 1.6 million children between the ages of 10
and 15 in the workforce in 1910 and 1.4 million in 1920 (p. 5), before stiff
immigration laws reduced the nearly free flow of cheap labor in the mid-
1920s. While child labor, like slavery a half-century before in the eyes of
some defenders, would have just faded away as the result of some invisible,
yet inexorable force, the monopolists on the left were too impatient: "[N]o
argument that stresses the slow but steady improvement could slow down
the Progressive challenge, so long as one child [not 1.4 million children?] of
tender age continued to work" (p. 62). When the steady progress experi-
enced by American workers came to a crashing halt in the 1930s, New Deal
reformers were equally inept to enact "fair" competition, as they failed to
understand that the nation's economic woes were exacerbated by the two
"self-inflicted" wounds of the Smoot-Hawley tariff and currency deflation
(p. 63).
While Old Court justices, committed to scrutinizing statutes with a skepti-
cal eye, continued to put up a good fight against the regulatory onslaught in
cases such as A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States," ultimately
they gave way to the "Progressive intellectuals-turned-New Dealers" (p. 72)
who, deferential to the core, contorted the Commerce Clause in United States
v. Wrightwood Dairy Co.2 3 and Wickard v. Filburn.2 4 By the 1940s, the rewrit-
ing was complete: "Whether the issue was economics, religion, or speech,
constitutional protection remained at its low ebb under Progressive theories"
(p. 110).
Epstein identifies the constitutional jurisprudence of the "Post-Progressive
Period" with the bifurcated approach endorsed by the (in)famous footnote
four from United States v. Carolene Products Co. 5 He compliments JusticeHarlan Fiske Stone's plurality opinion for getting the essential issue of
Richard A. Epstein, Unconstitutional Conditions, State Power, and the Limits of Consent, 102 HARV.
L. REV. 5, 41-44 (1988); and Richard A. Epstein, The Proper Scope of the Commerce Power, 73 VA.
L. REV. 1387, 1430-32 (1987).
Epstein has thus distanced himself from the many social scientists, historians, and government
officials throughout the world who somehow fail to see that "there are two sides to this issue on the
merits." P. 43. See, e.g., HUGH D. HINDMAN, CHILD LABOR: AN AMERICAN HISTORY (2002);
STEPHEN B. WOOD, CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS IN THE PROGRESSIVE ERA: CHILD LABOR AND THE
LAW (1968).
22. Pp. 64-66; 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
23. Pp. 67-70; 315 U.S. 110 (1942).
24. Pp. 67 -72; 317 U.S. lll (1942).
25. Pp. 111-16; 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
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judicial oversight half-right,2 6 but proposes that, "[i]f Stone is correct, then a
set of uniform standards should make it more likely that judicial intervention
will respond to the risks to discrete and insular minorities" (p. 115). While
consistency is often a value in the decision-making process, judicial and
otherwise, Epstein still fails to explain why the judiciary's use of a classical
liberal litmus test (1) is explicitly or even implicitly required by the Consti-
tution, (2) would not end up in arbitrary contests among competing
individual rights, and (3) will not again (as it has in the Dred Scott and
Schechter Poultry past) threaten the delicate balance of power embodied in
our constitutional structure.
The closing chapter of How Progressives addresses "Progressivism To-
day," or at least as "Progressive" jurisprudence manifested itself in three
decisions from the October, 2004 Term of the Supreme Court. While, in
Epstein's view, the Court did take some positive steps during the Chief Jus-
ticeship of William H. Rehnquist, "beat[ing] a modest retreat from the
commerce power's high-water mark" (p. 74), the Court blundered in Gon-
zalez v. Raich,2'7 when, in invalidating under federal controlled-substances
law the medical-marijuana-use provisions of the California Compassionate
Use Act, it failed to correct the gross Commerce Clause expansion in
Wickard. Deference was also, to Epstein (pp. 121-26), the unfortunate rule
in Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., in which two lower federal courts used dic-
tum from a 1980 regulatory takings case that suggested a slightly heightened
standard of review 28 "to strike down a Hawaii statute that limits the rent that
oil companies may charge to dealers who lease service stations owned by
the companies., 29 Rather than commending the lower courts for their compe-
tent Old Court-style economic analysis, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor's
opinion beat a retreat to the more pro-regulatory standard of Penn Central
Transportation Co. v. New York City.3 The third notable example of the
Court's twenty-first century "Progressivism" was the highly controversial
holding in Kelo v. City of New London,3' the eminent domain case in which
"a five-member liberal majority" (a group that included Justice Anthony
Kennedy) (pp. 127-28) sided with government regulators and private devel-
opers over homeowners whose property was targeted by a large-scale
economic development project. The "one jurisprudential lesson that should
26. Epstein writes, "[T]here is nothing wrong with Stone's instinct that the courts must inter-
vene in those cases in which the political process breaks down." P. 114.
27. 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
28. See Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980) ("The application of a general
zoning law to particular property effects a taking if the ordinance does not substantially advance
legitimate state interests.").
29. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 532 (2005).
30. Id. at 538-40 (rejecting the "substantially advance[s]" test and citing factors in Penn
Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978), as the proper basis for de-
termining whether a regulation results in a taking).
31. 545 U.S. 469 (2005). For the numerous state legislative and judicial responses in the
wake of Kelo, see, for example, 13 RICHARD R. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY §
79F.03[3][b] (Michael Allan Wolf general ed., Matthew Bender 2006).
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be learned from Kelo," according to Epstein, "is that the Progressive tradi-
tion continues to operate in its bankrupt fashion to the present day" (p. 134),
despite the fact that the admittedly expansive interpretation of the phrase
"public use" found in the Takings Clause has a history reaching much far-
ther back than the opening years of the twentieth century.
II. STARTING IN THE MIDDLE
The major constitutional crime of the "Progressives," as suggested by the
book's title, is that "[t]hey saw in constitutional interpretation the opportunity
to rewrite a Constitution that showed at every turn the influence of John Locke
and James Madison into a different Constitution, which reflected the wisdom
of the leading intellectual reformers of their own time" (p. 135). In fact, these
undeniably reformist judges were un-rewriting the Constitution, correcting the
textual emendations attempted by the Old Court.
Epstein, like so many others who tell stories of constitutional history, is
starting in the middle. He presents the element of "liberty of contract," for
example, as a fait accompli, a supposedly inherent constitutional element
that, given the affections of Locke and Madison, needed no articulation in
the actual writing of the document. Yet the skepticism about the pedigree of
an expanded interpretation of the word "liberty," as it appears adjective-less
in both Due Process Clauses, is far from new. Consider, for example, the
conclusion that the Supreme Court historian Charles Warren drew in a 1926
Harvard Law Review article:
The phrase, "life, liberty or property without due process of law" came to
us from the English common law; and there seems to be little question
that, under the common law, the word "liberty" meant simply "liberty of
the person," or, in other words, "the right to have one's person free from
physical restraint." It did not include all a person's civil rights."
Warren then carefully traces the use of the term "liberty," failing to find any
significant expansion in state and federal courts between 1789 and 1868
(when the Fourteenth Amendment became law).33
The situation changed gradually over the course of the next three dec-
ades, beginning with Justices Joseph B. Bradley's and Noah Swayne's
dissents in 1873's Slaughter-House Cases,34 followed by two concurring
32. Charles Warren, The New "Liberty" Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 39 HARV. L.
REV. 431, 440 (1926); see also Charles E. Shattuck, The True Meaning of the Term "Liberty" in
Those Clauses in the Federal and State Constitutions Which Protect "Life, Liberty, and Property," 4
HARV. L. REV. 365, 391-92 (1891) ("[T]he tendency to give the clause a broad interpretation, and at
the least to include within the term 'liberty' the right to follow any lawful calling ... seems, upon
examination, to have little real foundation in history or principle.").
33. Warren writes, "In only one case does the term 'liberty' seem to have been given a wider
scope, prior to 1868." Warren, supra note 32, at 444 (discussing Herman v. State, 8 Ind. 545, 558-63
(1855)).
34. See 83 U.S. 36, 122 (1873) (Bradley, J., dissenting) ("[The citizens'] right of choice is a
portion of their liberty; their occupation is their property."); see also id. at 127 (Swayne, J., dissent-
ing) ("Liberty is freedom from all restraints but such as are justly imposed by law.").
April 20071
Michigan Law Review
35opinions in a monopoly case eleven years later ,s then dictum in an opinion
by the first Justice John M. Harlan from 1888,16 and culminating nine years
after that in Justice Rufus Peckham's opinion for a unanimous Court in All-
geyer v. Louisiana.37 The rewriting of the Due Process Clause by the Old
Court was complete when, in the last named case, the justices invalidated a
statute prohibiting contracts with marine insurance companies that did not
comply with state law, offering as their rationale:
The liberty mentioned in th[e] [Fourteenth] [A]mendment means not only
the right of the citizen to be free from the mere physical restraint of his
person, as by incarceration, but the term is deemed to embrace the right of
the citizen to be free in the enjoyment of all his faculties, to be free to use
them in all lawful ways, to live and work where he will, to earn his liveli-
hood by any lawful calling, to pursue any livelihood or avocation, and for
that purpose to enter into all contracts which may be proper, necessary and
essential to his carrying out to a successful conclusion the purposes above
mentioned.38
That the process of engrafting a change onto the text of the Constitu-
tion-in a familiar common-law pattern of dissent to dictum to holding-
was not sudden does not detract from the fact that a rewriting took place, a
rewriting that some "Progressive" judges sought to undo before, during, and
after the New Deal.
III. THE VOICE OF MODERATION?
The three cases discussed in the final chapter of How Progressives-
Raich, Lingle, and Kelo-are important because they illustrate the signifi-
cant gaps that, despite the Court's shift rightward in membership and
ideology, still exist between Epstein's ideas about federalism and individual
rights and the modem Court's jurisprudence. In each case, Epstein partici-
pated in an amicus curiae brief suggesting a strategy that even the Rehnquist
Court chose not to follow. 39 In the Institute of Justice brief in support of the
respondents in Raich, Epstein and his coauthors sought to have Wickard
35. See Butchers' Union Slaughter-House & Live-Stock Landing Co. v. Crescent City Live-
Stock Landing & Slaughter-House Co., 11 U.S. 746, 754 (1884) (Field, J., concurring); id. at 760
(Bradley, J., concurring).
36. Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678, 684 (1888). Justice Field reiterated his expansive
understanding of "liberty," this time as a dissenter.
37. 165 U.S. 578 (1897).
38. Id. at 589.
39. In How Progressives, Epstein notes his amicus participation in the three cases. See pp.
149 n.196 (Raich); 150 n.208 (Lingle); 151 n.217 (Kelo). Because of a typographical problem (there
are two footnotes numbered "180" on pages 107 and 108), the footnotes do not match the references
in the last thirty pages of the text.
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overruled. 40 The Court was unpersuaded, as Wickard was cited as controlling
41law in three opinions in the case.
In its attempt to push takings law beyond its current boundaries, the
Cato Institute's amicus brief in support of the private respondents in Lingle,
also coauthored by Epstein, was equally unconvincing. The brief urged the
Court to revisit the question of the constitutionality of rent control, deeming
the device "a paradigmatic physical taking. '42 Epstein and his coauthor also
instructed the justices on the analytical shortcomings displayed by the Court
in its confrontation with World War I-era rent control in Block v. Hirsch.43
Cato was rebuffed on both counts by a unanimous Court, which chose to
avoid the courtroom contests between public and private sector economic
experts that Epstein encourages.
In Cato's amicus brief in support of the homeowner-petitioners in Kelo,
Epstein and his coauthors again tried to push the takings envelope a bit too
far in the eyes of all but two justices. Asserting that "Condemnation For
Blight Does Not Meet The Standard For Public Use,"44 the brief railed
against "[b]road deference under a lax standard" and criticized the source of
that deference-the Court's 1954 opinion in Berman v. Parker.45 In Kelo,
Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy, concurring, and
Justice O'Connor, for four dissenters, refused to abandon Berman.46
The Rehnquist Court was not anxious, or even willing, to follow Ep-
stein's lead by revisiting long-abandoned pre-New Deal constitutional
principles. If Epstein can somehow convince a majority of the justices or a
meaningful segment of influential Court observers that the Old Court's mod-
erate jurisprudence was replaced by an extremist Progressive agenda, his
ideas will be much more palatable.
In Epstein's exaggerated version of "Progressivism," there seem few dis-
tinctions between the regulatory programs enacted in the early twentieth
40. See Brief for the Institute of Justice as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 14-15,
Ashcroft v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005), sub nom. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2004) (No. 03-1454),
2004 WL 2336487 ("The scope of federal power can be rationalized only by taking the simple but
critical step of returning Commerce Clause jurisprudence to its settled limits prior to the New Deal
developments that culminated in the Wickard decision.").
41. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 15-22, 32-33 (2001) (majority opinion); id. at 37 n.2
(Scalia, J., concurring); id. at 43-44, 47, 50-51 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
42. Brief for the Cato Institute as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 20, Lingle v.
Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528 (2005) (No. 04-163), 2005 WL 65495 [hereinafter Lingle Brief].
43. 256 U.S. 135 (1921); see Lingle Brief, supra note 42, at 27 n.15 ("Those controls were
hastily upheld based not only on an immature takings law but on a poor understanding of the eco-
nomics of rent regulation.").
44. Brief for the Cato Institute as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 16, Kelo v. City
of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005) (No. 04-108), 2004 WL 2802972.
45. Id. at 18 (citing Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954)).
46. See, Kelo, 545 U.S. at 480-82, 484, 489; id. at 490, 492-93 (Kennedy, J., concurring); id.
at 498-500, 504 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Only Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia in dissent,
shared the Cato brief's skepticism about the deference given to Berman, in an opinion designed to
have the Court rethink the long line of cases that "have strayed from the [Public Use] Clause's
original meaning." Id. at 506 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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century and the socialism envisioned by Bellamy and others of his ilk. Early
in How Progressives, Epstein notes that "[c]ritics of the classical liberal po-
sition have a field day in thinking that positions such as my own (and others
still more modest in their intentions) will 'turn the clock back' and so plunge
us into some legal Dark Age" (p. xii). He immediately turns to an example
of this animosity drawn from the Senate confirmation hearings for Chief
Justice John Roberts, during which Senator Arlen Specter "revealed an un-
sympathetic attitude toward the modest incursions on the New Deal
Commerce Clause jurisprudence" (p. xii). Returning the focus to himself
and his ideas, Epstein states, without citing any specific sources, that these
same critics "happily brand as 'radicals' or 'extreme right-wing ideologues'
anyone who holds views that remotely resemble my own. Their goal is to
exclude those views in selecting Supreme Court justices and in framing the
constitutional agenda of the next generation" (pp. xii-xiii). If Epstein can
convince his readers that his classical liberal principles are not radical or
extreme, he is one step closer to achieving the goal of "sound constitutional
government in the years to come" (p. xiii).
One important element of Epstein's strategy, then, is to convey the idea,
illustrated in Figure 1, that classical liberalism is a moderate position situ-
ated between two extremes: "pure" (also called "hard" or "hard-line")
libertarianism and "Progressivism." Early in the book, Epstein seeks to "ex-
plain how [the classical liberal position] differs from the pure libertarian
theory with which it is closely allied" (p. 14). For the purists, it is "difficult,
perhaps impossible, to accept any forced exchanges initiated by the state for
the common good" (p. 16). Thus, taxation and condemnation fall "out of
bounds"; classical liberals are more accepting of government, acknowledg-
ing that "some form of state power is needed to preserve the liberties that
both groups believe should be protected" (p. 16). Classical liberals' recogni-
tion of "an inherent state police power" in the criminal and nuisance
contexts, their knowledge that "self-help and other forms of coordinated
voluntary action" are sometimes inadequate to counter "dangerous activi-
ties," and their acceptance of "the proposition that certain forms of market
failure require, or at least allow, some form of government intervention"
also create distance between the two individualistic, liberty-loving groups
(pp. 16-17). Moreover, while the "strong libertarian has little use for anti-
trust law," the classical liberal, following Adam Smith's lead, "treats cartels
as presumptively illegal because in raising prices and lowering output they
diminish social utility" (p. 41).
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FIGURE I
AN EPSTEINIAN VIEW OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY4 7
I I I
Progressivism Classical Liberalism Libertarianism
(PROG) (CL) (LIB)
(Louis D. Brandeis) (Richard Epstein) (Randy Barnett)
In Epstein's version of Supreme Court history, the Old Court justices,
who held power before "the Supreme Court's final vindication of Franklin
Roosevelt's New Deal legislation in the Court's decisive 1936 term" (p. 1),
were also moderates who were more in touch with the classical liberal phi-
losophy of the Constitution than their reformist colleagues. 48 He reminds us
that "it is critical to remember that no justice of the Supreme Court has ever
held that all forms of state regulation are unconstitutional" (p. 52). He even
criticizes the traditionalists for giving "too much leeway to state police
power by allowing state regulation in cases in which contracts could work
well, and by their willingness to disallow employers the assumption-of-risk
defense in many industrial accident cases. 49
Another way to situate one's position in the middle range, away from the
radical fringe, is to portray opposing philosophies and their adherents as
dangerously extreme. Such is the case with Epstein's portrayal of the enemy
to his left, the agglomeration he calls "Progressives." The chapter he titles
47. Figure 1 is purposely primitive, so the reader should not quibble with the exact location
of each position on the scale. What is important is the centrist position of classical liberalism in
contrast with the alternatives on its far left and right.
48. For a recent and highly provocative exploration of the debate over the nature and extent
of the "Constitutional Revolution of 1937," see Laura Kalman, The Constitution, the Supreme Court,
and the New Deal, 110 AM. HIsT. REV. 1052 (2005).
49. P. 50. This instance is not the first time that Epstein has used his libertarian colleagues as
a convenient foil. When Professors Barnett, David Friedman, and James P. Pinkerton responded to
his talk on "The Limits of Liberty: Why we need taxation and eminent domain," Epstein's final
word was called "A Moderate Responds." After criticizing his colleagues for carrying their libertari-
anism too far, Epstein commented, "It's nice, just this once, to occupy the odd position of being a
moderate." This provocative exchange over the legitimacy of eminent domain under any circum-
stances and the wisdom of eliminating the state suggests that, in the right company, any position can
appear to be middle-of-the-road. Richard A. Epstein, Randy Barnett, David Friedman, & James P.
Pinkerton, Coercion vs. Consent, REASON, Mar. 2004, available at http://www.reason.com/news/
show/29069.html.
50. Now that "liberal," the "L-word," is out of fashion, see, e.g., Joe Conason, Branding
Kerry with the L-word, SALON, Mar. 2, 2004, http://dir.salon.com/story/opinion/conasoni2004/03/
02/kerry/index.html (last visited Nov. 29, 2006), many on the political left, and some on the right,
have taken to calling themselves and their causes "progressive." By casting "Progressives" and
"Progressivism" in a negative light, Epstein is bucking a trend among ideologues of many persua-
sions. For examples of erstwhile liberals' attempts to recast themselves as "progressives," see
Anthony Howard, "Progressive" Democrats flee from the liberal ghosts of conventions past, TIMES
(London), Aug. 27, 1996; Progressive Patriots Fund-Russ Feingold, Honorary Chair,
http://www.progressivepatriotsfund.com (last visited Nov. 29, 2006). Center-left think tanks also
engage in this rhetorical shift. See, e.g., Progressive Policy Institute: About the Progressive Policy
Institute, http://www.ppionline.org/ppi-ci.cfm?knlgArealD=87&subseclD=205&contentD=896
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"The Progressive Era" includes criticisms of cases decided as late as 1942
and 1943, despite the fact that the historical period known as the "Progres-
sive Era" ended during or shortly after World War I.5 If this were an isolated
instance of mislabeling it would be easy to overlook. A close reading of
How Progressives reveals, however, that this is just one example of Ep-
stein's attempts to marginalize a wide range of government regulation and
the support of regulation generally by the judiciary." The goal of highlight-
ing the inherent moderation of classical liberalism is enhanced by
contrasting it with the most egregious examples of government overreaching
and judicial abdication.
In this exaggerated version of Progressivism, there seem few distinctions
between the regulatory programs enacted in the early twentieth century and
the socialism envisioned by Bellamy and others of his ilk. However, because
rhetoric and hyperbole are poor substitutes for historical inquiry, the charac-
terization of Progressivism in How Progressives is unsupported and
misleading. In reality, history does not supply the support for the nearly
wholesale rejection of New Deal-era jurisprudence that Epstein has urged as
a decidedly immoderate friend of the Court.
IV. WINNER'S HISTORY? NOT QUITE YET
In many ways, How Progressives reads like winner's history: an account
of the past, written by the victor at the end of a struggle, that diminishes the
(last visited Nov. 29, 2006) ("PPI's mission is to define and promote a new progressive politics for
America in the 21st century."). Even some on the right are not yet ready to concede the term to the
opposition. See, e.g., David Brooks, The Era of Small Government Is Over, WKLY. STANDARD, Oct.
2, 2000, at 13 ("Americans are progressive in the sense that they also believe in banding together for
great leaps into the future.").
51. See, e.g., ARTHUR A. EKIRCH, JR., PROGRESSIVISM IN AMERICA: A STUDY OF THE ERA
FROM THEODORE ROOSEVELT TO WOODROW WILSON 3 (1974) ("The Progressive Era, that transpar-
ently optimistic label that historians, almost uniformly, have fastened on the first decade and a half
of the twentieth century, may also be considered the climax of the nineteenth century."); GABRIEL
KOLKO, THE TRIUMPH OF CONSERVATISM: A REINTERPRETATION OF AMERICAN HISTORY, 1900-
1916, at 2 (1963) ("[Tjhe period from approximately 1900 until the United States' intervention in
[World War I], [has been] labeled the 'progressive' era by virtually all historians."); MICHAEL
MCGERR, A FIERCE DISCONTENT: THE RISE AND FALL OF THE PROGRESSIVE MOVEMENT IN AMER-
ICA, 1870-1920, at 313 (2003) (noting that, after the 1920 election, "progressive ideas would linger,
occasional progressive legislation would still pass; but the Progressive Era was over").
52. The following is a list of a few of the many "Progressive" evils Epstein includes in the
book, with italics provided for the most immoderate phrases that convey the idea that Progressivism
is an extreme and irrational, if not dangerous, movement.
"'[The Progressives] were determined that their vision of the managed economy should
take precedence in all areas of life" (p. 136; emphasis added).
'Progressives were champions of economic nationalism with its cardinal principle that
the extensive interconnection of all aspects of the American economy cried out for fed-
eral regulation" (p. 8; emphasis added).
" 'The Progressives seized on the admitted need for some police power to argue that just
about every form of state regulation was permissible" (p. 45; emphasis added).
" '[T]he sprawling Penn Central test, while highly favorable to government in most cases,
represents the kind of unprincipled ad hoc thinking that is so congruent with the Progres-
sive Era" (pp. 123-24; emphasis added).
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achievements of the losers and makes the winner's triumph somehow seem
inevitable. There is a kind of giddy confidence that infuses Epstein's rheto-
ric, which may explain the book's conflation of Progressivism and socialist
state control and the author's assertion that government regulation exacer-
bated the economic problems of the 1930s and poisoned the constitutional
well for decades to follow. The uncritical reader who follows the narrative
flow should come to the conclusion that Progressive jurisprudence, at least
the decidedly negative version portrayed in the book, deserved to die out.
For the careful reader, however, the author's indifference to essential his-
torical details detracts from the impact of How Progressives. Consider these
anachronistic, inaccurate, and misleading passages:
"The Progressives were the self-conscious social and legal reformers
who occupied center stage in the period roughly from the onset of the
20th century through the election of Franklin Delano Roosevelt as
president in 1932.""
"[M]ost of the innovative, if controversial, domestic programs of the
New Deal were in fact direct outgrowths of the Progressive campaign
for larger, more active government during the 30-plus years preceding
the watershed events of 19377'"
"[T]o achieve their expansive social ends, Progressives adopted a 'real-
ist' jurisprudence that broke sharply from the then-dominant 'formalist'
approach to law, which they dismissed as 'blind' to the massive power
shifts in social relations that took place with industrialization following
the Civil War.5
53. P. 2. In reality, the Progressives were summarily ejected from the "center stage" of
American politics and society in the 1920s, the post-war and post-reform period we identify with
Warren G. Harding's campaign phrase, "return to normalcy." Moreover, as Epstein himself demon-
strates in How Progressives, reform-minded justices were not consistently successful in achieving
their big-government agenda until Franklin Roosevelt's second presidential term. For a much more
subtle account of the shifts that occurred in constitutional jurisprudence in the decades before the
judicial triumph of the New Deal, see Robert C. Post, Defending the Lifeworld: Substantive Due
Process in the Taft Court Era, 78 B.U. L. REV. 1489, 1492-93 (1998).
54. Pp. 2-3. Though not unprecedented among non-historian commentators, Epstein's con-
flation of Progressives and New Dealers ignores the important differences that caused many older
reformers to reject the dramatic growth of federal power embodied in the Roosevelt administration's
multi-front war on the Great Depression. For example, Justice Brandeis, in many ways the quintes-
sential Progressive lawyer and judge, jumped off the reform bandwagon in Schechter Poultry, a
decision celebrated by Epstein. Pp. 64-66; see PURCELL, supra note 18, at 135.
Brandeis was far from unique. Fifty years ago Richard Hofstadter drew important distinctions
between the waves of reform that swept over the nation beginning at the end of the nineteenth cen-
tury. See RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF REFORM: FROM BRYAN TO F.D.R. (1955). On the
continuing impact and import of this monumental work see DAVID S. BROWN, RICHARD HOFSTAD-
TER: AN INTELLECTUAL BIOGRAPHY 99-119 (2006). For other works noting the Progressive/New
Deal divisions, see ALAN BRINKLEY, THE END OF REFORM: NEW DEAL LIBERALISM IN RECESSION
AND WAR 8-11 (1995); OTIS L. GRAHAM, JR., AN ENCORE FOR REFORM: THE OLD PROGRESSIVES
AND THE NEW DEAL (1967); James A. Henretta, Charles Evans Hughes and the Strange Death of
LiberalAmerica, 24 LAW & HIST. REV. 115, 115-16 (2006).
55. P. 3. Epstein is talking not about legal realism, a movement that began in earnest in the
1920s, but its precursor of sorts-sociological jurisprudence. See, e.g., PURCELL, supra note 18, at
79; G. Edward White, From Sociological Jurisprudence to Realism: Jurisprudence and Social
Change in Early Twentieth-Century America, 58 VA. L. REV. 999 (1972).
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"[T]he most conspicuous portion of the Progressive platform was its
deep conviction that the antitrust law should apply only to 'ordinary'
businesses, and not to the Progressives' two favored constituencies-
farmers and laborers. The point was made crystal clear in the 1914
modifications of the Clayton Act, which exempted both labor unions
and agricultural (and, for good measure, horticultural) activities from
the operation of the statute ... ,,56
Epstein and his supporters might respond that these are minor quibbles and
not major analytical flaws. Yet, when the inaccuracies are corrected, a pro-
foundly different view of Progressivism emerges.
Equally ahistorical and ultimately disturbing is Epstein's attempt to
paint black-and-white portraits of the justices and their ideologies. Subtle
hues will not do when one is attempting to separate good "Old Court" (win-
ner) from bad "Progressive" (loser) jurists and the ideas they championed.
Figure 2 identifies several figures who are representative of positions in
post-1900 American political thought and plots them on a left-to-right scale.
This rough representation is by no means intended to fix those positions in a
definite spot, but rather to illustrate that at least one major Progressive
thinker and reformer, lawyer and then Justice Louis Brandeis, distanced
himself at times from committed New Dealers such as future Justice Wil-
liam 0. Douglas, who endorsed a much larger role for the federal
government during the Great Depression. Moreover, while Douglas would
not have been embarrassed by the moniker "liberal," he (justifiably) would
have appreciated the significant distance between his own ideology and that
of a devoted Socialist such as Eugene V. Debs. Finally, all three of the fig-
ures from the center to the left of the figure would distinguish their pro-
government positions from Professors Epstein and Barnett, who view state
regulation with a much more jaundiced eye.
56. P. 85. The real story of the passage of the Clayton Act actually involves a betrayal of
Progressivism. See EKIRCH, supra note 51, at 234-35 ("Though organized labor.., protested vehe-
mently that the Democrats had reneged on their campaign promise to exempt labor organizations
from the Sherman law, Samuel Gompers optimistically called the modified anti-injunction clause in
the Clayton Act 'labor's Magna Charta.' "); see also MCGERR, supra note 5 1, at 145 ("the Clayton
Act, full of loopholes, was hardly [labor's 'Magna Carta']. As the general counsel of the American
Anti-Boycott Association smugly explained, the measure had only 'slight practical importance.' ").
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FIGURE 2
REPRESENTATIVE FIGURES IN MODERN AMERICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT
I I I I I
Socialist New Deal Progressive CL LIB
Liberal
(Eugene V. (William 0. (Brandeis) (Epstein) (Barnett)
Debs) Douglas)
It is equally important to acknowledge that reformers during the first
two decades of the twentieth century who identified themselves as "Progres-
sive" advocated a wide range of positions.57 Moreover, some Progressive
causes-such as immigration restriction targeting southern and eastern
Europeans58 and, as Epstein notes (p. 107), eugenics-today seem much less
admirable than, say, Jane Addams's settlement house movement5 9 and Lin-
coln Steffens's muckraking.6°
As with many Americans, lawyers and nonlawyers, who were active in
various reform movements during the opening decades of the twentieth cen-
tury, but who sometimes reflected more traditional values, it is difficult to
pigeonhole individual Supreme Court justices as "Old Court" traditionalists
or "Progressive" radicals, much more difficult than Epstein's narrative
would suggest. Who exactly is a "Progressive" justice? Is it a justice who
was appointed by a Progressive President? If so, then Oliver Wendell
61Holmes, William R. Day, and William H. Moody (appointed by Theodore
Roosevelt) would qualify, as would Woodrow Wilson appointees James C.
McReynolds, Louis D. Brandeis, and John H. Clarke. If by "Progressive"
Epstein instead means a justice who had been active before 1920 in one or
more important Progressive causes or who was active as a Progressive poli-
tician sometime before appointment, the list would no longer include
Holmes and Day, and would still include Moody, McReynolds, Brandeis,
and Clarke. We would then add Franklin D. Roosevelt appointees Stanley
57. For the richness and variety of the causes (admirable and otherwise) championed by
what we call the "Progressive movement," see, for example, EKIRCH, supra note 51, and McGERR,
supra note 51.
58. See, e.g., JOHN HIGHAM, STRANGERS IN THE LAND: PATTERNS OF AMERICAN NATIVISM
1860-1925, at 97-193 (1963); MCGERR, supra note 51, at 210-14; BARBARA MILLER SOLOMON,
ANCESTORS AND IMMIGRANTS: A CHANGING NEW ENGLAND TRADITION 82-209 (1956).
59. See, e.g., JANE ADDAMS, TWENTY YEARS AT HULL-HOUSE (1910); JEAN BETHKE
ELSHTAIN, JANE ADDAMS AND THE DREAM OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2002); MCGERR, supra note
5 1, at 53-69.
60. See LINCOLN STEFFENS, THE SHAME OF THE CITIES (Double Day & Co. 1948) (1904).
61. Professor White has written masterfully and convincingly about the changing reputation
of Holmes and the ways in which the "Progressive" mantle is an uncomfortable fit. See G. EDWARD
WHITE, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE NEW DEAL 273-76 (2000); G. EDWARD WHITE, JUSTICE
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES: LAW AND THE INNER SELF 354-69 (1993); G. Edward White, The Rise
and Fall of Justice Holmes, 39 U. CHI. L. REV. 51 (1971).
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Reed, Felix Frankfurter, and James F Byrnes, along with Warren G. Hard-
ing appointees George Sutherland, William Howard Taft, and Edward T.
Stanford (like Taft, a trust-buster), and Charles Evans Hughes, who was ap-
pointed by Taft (Associate) and Herbert Hoover (Chief).62
In reality, Supreme Court Justices during the early twentieth century
aligned and realigned with some frequency, belying the static view of judi-
cial philosophies described by Epstein. Figure 3 provides the voting
alignments for the Justices forming the majority in major cases decided be-
tween 1895 and 1945 that form the decisional database in How
Progressives. While it is hard to deny that certain justices, particularly those
appointed by Franklin Roosevelt, were much more deferential to govern-
ment regulation 63 than their predecessors and more senior colleagues, the
jurisprudential picture is, upon close examination, more fluid during the
years leading up to the "switch in time that saved nine. 64
62. For biographical information on the Justices, see BIOGRAPHICAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE
SUPREME COURT: THE LIVES AND LEGAL PHILOSOPHIES OF THE JUSTICES (Melvin I. Urofsky ed.,
2006).
Presidents can also be hard to place in one camp or another, if we use simplistic litmus tests.
For example, what are we to make of the fact that the undeniably Progressive Woodrow Wilson
wrote the following federalist-flavored passage in a book that first appeared in 1908?
May [Congress] also regulate the conditions under which the merchandise is produced which
is presently to become the subject-matter of interstate commerce? May it regulate the condi-
tions of labor in field and factory? Clearly not, I should say; and I should think that any
thoughtful lawyer who felt himself at liberty to be frank would agree with me. For that would
be to destroy all lines of division between the field of state legislation and the field of federal
legislation.
WOODROW WILSON, CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 170-71 (1908).
In the same work, the future President, whom Epstein justifiably criticizes for resegregating
the federal civil service, pp. 102-03, observed in opposition to child labor laws, "[i]f the power to
regulate commerce between the States can be stretched to include the regulation of labor in mills
and factories, it can be made to embrace every particular of the industrial organization and action of
the country" WILSON, supra at 179; see also Mark R. Killenbeck, The Hand Maid of Liberty?, 55
ARK. L. REV. 711, 726-27 (2003).
Based on this evidence, should we reclassify Wilson as a classical liberal? Or, does it make
more sense to consider whether there were elements of classical liberalism, federalism, conserva-
tism, Progressivism, and pragmatism in this complex political figure?
Given Wilson's strongly articulated objection to federal child labor legislation, the President
was not an easy sell when the Keating-Owen bill was working its way through Congress. Until the
summer of 1916, when Wilson faced a tough reelection campaign against Charles Evans Hughes,
the President had remained silent in the debate over the bill. Then, "aware of public pressure for
immediate enactment, he concluded that ... victory at the polls could be achieved only by convinc-
ing Progressives that the Democratic party was the party of reform." WALTER I. TRAT'rNER,
CRUSADE FOR THE CHILDREN: A HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL CHILD LABOR COMMITTEE AND CHILD
LABOR REFORM IN AMERICA 130 (1970); see also ARTHUR S. LINK, WOODROW WILSON AND THE
PROGRESSIVE ERA: 1910-1917, at 226-27 (1954). In this way, political expediency apparently
trumped philosophical and jurisprudential objections.
63. There is a reductionist aspect to How Progressives, in that Epstein comes to equate "Pro-
gressive" jurisprudence with deference, pure and simple. See, e.g., p. 117 ("The central tenet of
judicial deference on questions of property fights and economic liberties continues to work itself
into the fabric of modem law."); p. 125 ("Unless there is some clear sense of what counts as fight
and wrong, the strong element of deference nurtured in the Progressive Era will continue to hold
sway in property cases just as it did in economic liberty cases.").
64. In today's historical patois, Epstein's version of the Court's famous "switch," p. 1 ("It
was then that the Court bowed to the New Deal, shortly after Roosevelt unveiled his infamous
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FIGURE 3
MAJORITY VOTING ALIGNMENT IN SUPREME COURT CASES
DISCUSSED BY EPSTEIN: I895-194565
GOODI
BAD CASE CITATION JUSTICES IN MAJORITY SUBJECT PAGE YEAR
GOOD' United States v. E.C. Knight Co., BREWER, BROWN, FIELD, FULLER, Antitrust 34 1895
156 U.S. 1 (1895) GRAY, JACKSON(H), SHIRAS, WHITE
BAD Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 BROWN, FIELD, FULLER, GRAY, Race 102 1896
(1896) PECKHAM, SHIRAS, WHITE discrimination
GOOD Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. BREWER, BROWN, FULLER, GRAY, Antitrust 34 1899
United States, 175 U.S. 211 HARLAN(I), McKENNA, PECKHAM,
1(1899) SHIRAS, WHITE
BAD Champion v. Ames (The Lottery BROWN, HARLAN(I), HOLMES, Anti-Lottery Act 70 1903
Case), 188 U.S. 321 (1903) McKENNA, WHITE
GOOD Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 BREWER, BROWN, DAY, FULLER, Antitrust 35 1905
U.S. 375 (1905) HARLAN(I), HOLMES, McKENNA,
PECKHAM, WHITE
GOOD Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 BREWER, BROWN, FULLER, McKENNA, Ten-hour workday 48 1905
1(1905) PECKHAM
GOOD Clark v. Nash, 198 U.S. 361 BROWN, DAY, FULLER, HOLMES, Public use 132 1905
(1905) McKENNA, PECKHAM, WHITE
GOOD Strickley v. Highland Boy Gold BREWER, BROWN, DAY, FULLER, Public use 133 1906
Mining Co., 200 U.S. 527 (1906) HARLAN(I), HOLMES, McKENNA, n.233
PECKHAM, WHITE
GOOD Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. BREWER, DAY, FULLER, HARLAN(I), Labor contracts 48 1908
1161(1908) PECKHAM, WHITE
BAD Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 BREWER, DAY, FULLER, HARLAN(I), Ten-hour workday 90 1908(1908) HOLMES, McKENNA, MOODY, PECKHAM,
WHITE
GOOD" Second Employers' Liability DAY, HOLMES, HUGHES, LAMAR, Railroad liability 46 1912
Cases, 223 U.S. 1 (1912) LURTON, McKENNA, VAN DEVANTER, n.79
WHITE
BAD The Shreveport Rate Cases, 234 DAY, HOLMES, HUGHES, LAMAR, Railroad rates 53 1914
U.S. 342 (1914) McKENNA, VAN DEVANTER, WHITE
GOOD Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 LAMAR, McKENNA, McREYNOLDS, Labor contracts 49 1915
(1915) PITNEY, VAN DEVANTER, WHITE
GOOD N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co. v. White, 243 BRANDEIS, CLARKE, DAY, HOLMES, Workers' 46 1917
U.S. 188 (1917) McKENNA, McREYNOLDS, PITNEY, VAN compensation
DEVANTER, WHITE
Court-packing scheme-his threat to pack a recalcitrant Court with six new members."), would be
characterized as "externalist" See Kalman, supra note 48, at 1054-55 ("Extemalists argue for the
importance of politics, making the case that Roberts and Hughes, and therefore the Court, dramati-
cally changed course during the 'constitutional revolution of 1937' because of the threat posed by
the 1936 election and/or the Court-packing plan."). No matter what label is used (if any), Kalman
and other historians have struggled mightily with the difficult question of causation in an effort to
understand the complex nature of constitutional change.
65. In Figure 3, "GOOD/BAD" refers to Epstein's estimation of the case in How Progres-
sives, the author of the majority opinion is in bold, and "PAGE" refers to the page in the book at
which the reader can find Epstein's discussion of the cited case.
66. Epstein writes that in E.C. Knight "the Supreme Court rightly stated that manufacturing
fell outside the scope of the commerce power, but wrongly concluded that a merger of corporations
that did business in New York and Pennsylvania should be treated as manufacturing." P. 34.
67. Epstein does note that courts in cases such as this provided "much deference to the legis-
lature-too much in my view, given the interest-group politics that could lead to the adoption or
rejection of certain [tort] rules" (p. 47).
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GOOD/
BAD CASE CITATION JUSTICES IN MAJORITY SUBJECT PAGE YEAR
GOOD Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. DAY, McKENNA, McREYNOLDS, PITNEY, Labor contracts 49 1917
Mitchell, 245 U.S. 229 (1917) VAN DEVANTER, WHITE
GOOD Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. DAY, McREYNOLDS, PITNEY, VAN Child labor 58 1918
251 (1918) DEVANTER, WHITE
BAD" Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. CLARKE, DAY, McKENNA, Free speech 100 1919
616(1919) McREYNOLDS, PITNEY, VAN DEVANTER,
WHITE
GOOD Duplex Printing Press Co. v. DAY, McKENNA, McREYNOLDS, PITNEY, Antitrust/ 87 1921
Deering, 254 U.S. 443 (1921) VAN DEVANTER, WHITE Labor
BAD R.R. Comm'n v. Chi., Burlington & BRANDEIS, CLARKE, DAY, HOLMES, Railroad fares 58 1922
Quincy R.R. Co., 257 U.S. 563 McKENNA, McREYNOLDS, PITNEY,
(1922) TAFT, VAN DEVANTER,
GOOD Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U.S. BRANDEIS, DAY, HOLMES, McKENNA, Child labor 62 1922
20(1922) McREYNOLDS, PITNEY, TAFT, VAN tax
DEVANTER
GOOD Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 BRANDEIS, BUTLER, McKENNA, Foreign language 103 1923
(1923) McREYNOLDS, SANFORD, TAFT, VAN
DEVANTER
GOOD Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 BRANDEIS, BUTLER, HOLMES, Private schools 103 1925
U.S. 510 (1925) McREYNOLDS, SANFORD, STONE,
SUTHERLAND. TAFT. VAN DEVANTER
BAD Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927) BRANDEIS, HOLMES, McREYNOLDS, Eugenics 107 1927
SANFORD, STONE, SUTHERLAND, TAFT,
VAN DEVANTER
GOOD New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, BUTLER, HUGHES, McREYNOLDS, Ice business 38 1932
285 U.S. 262 (1932) ROBERTS(O), SUTHERLAND, VAN regulation
DEVANTER
BAD Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 BRANDEIS, CARDOZO, HUGHES, Milk price controls 78 1934
(1934) ROBERTS(O), STONE
GOOD A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. BRANDEIS, BUTLER, HUGHES, Fair compensation 64 1935
United States, 295 U.S. 495 McREYNOLDS, ROBERTS(O), code
(1935) SUTHERLAND, VAN DEVANTER
GOOD Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig Inc., 294 BRANDEIS, BUTLER, CARDOZO, Milk price controls 80 1935
U.S. 511 (1935) HUGHES, McREYNOLDS, ROBERTS(O),
STONE, SUTHERLAND, VAN DEVANTER
BAD NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel BRANDEIS, CARDOZO, HUGHES, Unfair labor 66 1937
Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) ROBERTS(O), STONE practices
BAD W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 BRANDEIS, CARDOZO, HUGHES, Minimum wage 92 1937
U.S. 379 (1937) ROBERTS(O), STONE
GOOD S.C. State Highway Dep't v. BLACK, BRANDEIS, BUTLER, HUGHES, State highway 32 1938
Bamwell Bros., Inc., 303 U.S. 177 McREYNOLDS, ROBERTS(O), STONE regulation n.53
(1938)
BAD United States v. Carolene BLACK,0 BRANDEIS, HUGHES, Filled milk 112 1938
Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 ROBERTS(O), STONE regulation
(1938)
BAD Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, BLACK, DOUGLAS, FRANKFURTER, Flag salute 108 1940
310 U.S. 586 (1940) HUGHES, MURPHY, REED, ROBERTS(O)
BAD United States v. Wrightwood Dairy BLACK, BYRNES, DOUGLAS, Milk prices 67 1942
Co., 315 U.S. 110 (1942) FRANKFURTER, JACKSON(R), MURPHY,
REED, STONE
BAD Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 BLACK, BYRNES, DOUGLAS, Wheat crop quota 67 1942
(1942) FRANKFURTER, JACKSON(R), MURPHY,
_REED, ROBERTS(O), STONE
68. Epstein calls Holmes's dissent a "justly praised opinion" (p. 100).
69. Justice Black joined the Court's opinion except for that part of the opinion that contained
the famous footnote 4. See United States v. Carolene Products Co.. 304 U.S. 144. 155 (1938).
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GOOD/
BAD CASE CITATION JUSTICES IN MAJORITY SUBJECT PAGE YEAR
BAD Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 BLACK, BYRNES, DOUGLAS, Antitrust 84 1943
(1943) FRANKFURTER, JACKSON(R), MURPHY,
REED, ROBERTS(O), STONE
GOOD W.Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. BLACK, DOUGLASIJACKSON(R), Flag salute 109 1943
Bamette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) MURPHY, RUTLEDGE, STONE I____T____
GOOD IS. Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. FRANKFURTER, JACKSON(R), MURPHY, Train length limits 31 1945
761 (1945) IREED, ROBERTS(O), STONE I________
Here are some examples of that fluidity: Justices Holmes and McKenna
voted with the majority in the following "Good" (that is, classical liberal or
Old Court) cases: Swift, Clark, Strickley, Second Employers'Liability, New
York Central, and Child Labor Tax. McKenna, a President William
McKinley appointee, who made the "Good" majority possible in Lochner
and voted with the Old Court majority in Coppage and Hitchman, seemed to
betray classical liberalism with his votes in Lottery, Muller, Shreveport,
Abrams, and Railroad Commission. The "Bad" (that is, "Progressive") hold-
ings in Muller, Shreveport Rate, Abrams, Railroad Commission, and Buck
would not have been possible without the votes of supposedly "classical
liberal" justices. Justices Brandeis and McKenna voted with the "Good"
majority in Meyer, while Justices Holmes, Brandeis, and Stone voted with
the "Good" majority in Pierce. Justices Brandeis, Roberts, and Chief Justice
Hughes helped make possible the "Good" majorities in Schechter Poultry,
Baldwin (joined by Stone), and South Carolina State Highway (joined by
Black and Stone). We should not be surprised that, with some regularity,
accomplished politicians and experienced judges chose to follow their po-
litical instincts rather than abstract, absolutist principles from the eighteenth
century.
Despite the urgings of Epstein and his allies, "Progressivism" continues
to hold sway with politicians responsible for confirming new justices and
with the members of the early twenty-first-century Court. Therefore, we can
safely conclude that the winner's history that typifies How Progressives is a
bit premature. More time will have to pass. A few more generations of
Americans who experienced firsthand the dark side of unregulated business
and industry or heard those accounts directly from those who lived them
will have to die. And many more of these revisionist accounts will have to
appear in credible publications before a large percentage of the informed
public rejects what remains the predominant and, I believe, more accurate
account of American social conditions and the legal response those condi-
tions triggered during the opening decades of the twentieth century.
70. Justices Black and Douglas wrote, "We are substantially in agreement with the opinion
just read, but since we originally joined with the Court in the Gobiris case, it is appropriate that we
make a brief statement of reasons for our change of view." W.Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319
U.S. 623, 643 (1943) (Black and Douglas, JJ., concurring).
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